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CONTRACTS-Implied Employment Contracts Based on
Written Policy Statements Are Not Subject to
Governmental Immunity: Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District
I. INTRODUCTION
In Garciav. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District,' the New Mexico Supreme
Court found that an implied employment contract incorporating terms from a written
personnel policy statement met the statutory written contract exception to sovereign
immunity. In reaching its decision, the court held that New Mexico's statutory
written contract exception 2 waives sovereign immunity for both implied and express
contracts, so long as the relevant, disputed terms are in a writing. Garcia provides a
cause of action based on implied contract to plaintiffs who seek to recover against a
governmental entity if the plaintiffs can identify written terms that could be
incorporated into such a contract. As a result, Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy Districtpotentially broadens New Mexico's statutory written contract
exception to governmental immunity beyond the case's narrow holding.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Adolfo Garcia, began employment with the defendant, Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD), in 1975. 3 Garcia was employed by the
MRGCD without an express written contract. From 1976 until August, 1990, Garcia
held the position of Division Manager of the Belen Division of the MRGCD. In
August, 1990, the MRGCD demoted Garcia from Division Manager to Equipment
Operator. Garcia's demotion resulted in a pay reduction from $17.17 per hour to
$11.25 per hour. The MRGCD's General Manager notified Garcia by formal letter
that he was being demoted. During the term of Garcia's employment, the MRGCD
had a written Personnel Policy Statement containing detailed provisions relating to
its employment practices, including employee demotion.4
Garcia filed suit against the MRGCD and its board of directors for breach of
contract. In his complaint, Garcia alleged that his demotion did not comply with the
MRGCD's written Personnel Policy Statement. According to Garcia, the MRGCD's
Personnel Policy Statement requires the MRGCD to show good cause and to provide
employees with both notice and the opportunity to improve their performance before
the MRGCD demotes them.
The MRGCD submitted a motion for summary judgment in response to Garcia's
complaint, claiming governmental (sovereign) immunity. The MRGCD claimed that

1. 121 N.M. 728, 918 P.2d 7 (1996). Garcia'sholding answers a question concerning the scope of the written
contract exception that a badly fractured court refused to answer just two years before the Garcia decision, see
Swinney v. Deming Bd. of Educ., 117 N.M. 492, 873 P.2d 238 (1994).
2. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23(A) (Repi. Pamp. 1990).
3. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 730,918 P.2d at 9. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to the
facts of this case refer to this citation.
4. The policy statement included job descriptions and provisions relating to compensation levels, overtime
and compensatory time, time clock violations, tardiness, leave, and grounds for demotion or reclassification. See id.
at 732, 918 P.2d at 11.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

any employment contract between it and Garcia was implied at best. 5 To satisfy the
statutory exception to sovereign immunity for contract causes of action in New
Mexico Statutes Annotated section 37-1-23, a contract must be a "valid written
contract." An implied contract, the MRGCD argued, does not satisfy the requirement
of section 37-1-23. Therefore, as an implied contract, the alleged employment contact
between the MRGCD and Garcia was not a "valid written contract"7 which satisfied
the statutory exception to sovereign immunity. The district court granted the
MRGCD's motion for summary judgment.
The New Mexico Supreme Court took direct jurisdiction of Garcia's appeal from
the district court based on the jurisdiction it had at that time over appeals in contract
cases.8 The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to
the defendant, holding "that [the term] 'valid written contract' [as provided in section
37-1-23(A)] incorporate[d] the implied employment contract between the MRGCD
and Garcia."9 The supreme court then remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings on the merits.
III. BACKGROUND
A.

Nature of the Employment Contract
The general rule in New Mexico is that an employment contract is for an indefinite
period of time and may be terminated at the will of either party. 10 The employment
at will doctrine is based on traditional notions of freedom of contract. 1 Exceptions
to the "at will" doctrine include instances where the contract is supported by
consideration beyond the performance of duties and payment of wages, or where
there is an express provision in the contract concerning terms or duration. 2 New
Mexico courts also recognize a "public policy" exception to the doctrine, where
termination or demotion is in retaliation for employee conduct that promotes the
public interest, such as "whistleblowing. 13

5. The term "implied contract" in the context of Garciarefers to contracts that arise from promises inferred
wholly or partly by conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981). Such contracts are often referred

to as "implied in fact" contracts, and are not to be confused with "implied in law" or quasi-contracts. See id. § 4 cmt.
b, illus. 3.
6. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
7. See id.
8. See N.M. R. APP. PRoc. § 12-102(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1992). The New Mexico Supreme Court no longer
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in contract cases. See id. § 12-102 cmts. (Repl. Pamp. 1997) (citing Sept. 1,
1995 amendment).
9. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 121 N.M. 728, 734, 918 P.2d 7, 13 (1996).
10. See Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 115 N.M. 665,668, 857 P.2d 776, 779 (1993). Employment contracts
that do not explicitly state a definite duration are considered to be for an indefinite period and terminable at will. See
id. This is because there is no consideration other than performance of duties and payment of wages. See Melnick
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 730, 749 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1988).
11. See Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts, 1985
DUKE LJ. 196, 198. According to the notion of freedom of contract, the absence of a specific term for the duration
of an employment contract indicates a mutual desire of the parties to retain the freedom to end the employment
contract at any time. See id.
12. See Melnick, 106 N.M. at 730, 749 P.2d at 1109.
13. See Hartbarger,115 N.M. at 668, 857 P.2d at 779.
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New Mexico law provides that the plaintiff in a wrongful termination or demotion
action may bring suit in either tort or contract. 4 The cause of action in tort is the
public policy tort of wrongful or retaliatory discharge. In appropriate cases, a plaintiff
may also bring a "section 1983"'" cause of action based on federal civil rights
legislation.
Sovereign Immunity
Potential plaintiffs in employment termination or demotion cases involving
governmental entities must overcome the defense of governmental immunity for
causes of action based on contract. The nature of the defense under New Mexico law
has evolved from common law sovereign immunity with statutory waivers to
qualified sovereign immunity conferred by statute. Up until 1975, New Mexico
courts recognized the common law defense of sovereign immunity.' 6 However, the
state legislature also provided a statutory waiver 17of common law sovereign immunity
for causes of action based on written contracts.
In 1975, in Hicks v. State, the New Mexico Supreme Court prospectively
abolished the common law defense of sovereign immunity.' 8 In response to Hicks,
the New Mexico Legislature enacted qualified governmental immunity applicable
to both tort and contract causes of action.' 9 The qualified immunity established by the
state legislature in tort actions is a blanket immunity, with exceptions for certain
enumerated categories. 2' For contract actions, the Legislature granted governmental
entities immunity from liability, subject to a waiver of immunity for actions based on
written contracts. 2' In addition, the Legislature provided other statutory waivers to its
grant of sovereign immunity in contract actions that are not relevant to the Garcia
B.

case.

22

Finding an exception to sovereign immunity for actions based on contract may be
critical to a plaintiff seeking recovery against a governmental entity for demotion or
termination because tort and federal section 1983 actions also are subject to

14. See id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
16. See Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
17. See N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 22-23-1

(Cum. Supp. 1967) ("Actions not otherwise provided by law, may be

maintained and judgment enforced against the state and any of its agencies when based on a written contract.").
18. See Hicks, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153. Hicks was a claim against the State of New Mexico for tort
damages alleging negligence in constructing, operating, and maintaining a bridge. See id. A school bus and a cattle
truck collided on a narrow state highway bridge, killing and injuring school children and adult chaperones. See id.
The court abolished sovereign immunity, declaring it to be a judicially-created doctrine that was no longer applicable
to modem situations. See id. at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157.
19. Hicks was decided in 1975. See id. at 588, 544 P.2d at 1153. The original decision in Hicks was to be
at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157. Upon rehearing, the
applied retroactively to all pending cases not yet adjudicated. See id.
New Mexico Supreme Court modified its decision in Hicks, deciding that the decision should be applied
at 593, 544 P.2d at 1158. In response to the Hicks decision, the New Mexico Legislature
prospectively. See id.
enacted the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 1976 N.M. Laws ch. 58, in its next session. See Garcia v. Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy Dist., 121 N.M. 728, 731, 918 P.2d 7, 10 (1996). Although entitled the "New Mexico Tort
Claims Act," the New Mexico Legislature also reestablished sovereign immunity for actions based on contract in the
act. See 1976 N.M. Laws ch. 58. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act is codified at sections 41-4-1 to 41-4-27 of the
New Mexico Statutes. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1996).
20. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1996).

21. See id.§37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
22. See id.
§§ 37-1-24 to 31-1-26.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

sovereign immunity defenses. The statutory waivers to sovereign immunity
applicable to the above two types of causes of action may be narrower than that
which applies to a contract cause of action. For example, the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act2 grants governmental entities qualified sovereign immunity from claims
based on the public policy tort of retaliatory discharge.r The exceptions to sovereign
immunity for tort causes of action require a plaintiff to identify government conduct
that falls within one of the categories specified in the statute rather than under the
more general waiver available for contract causes of actions where the contact at
issue is written.25 Thus, in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a
plaintiff must bring retaliatory discharge actions within one of the statutory
exceptions to sovereign immunity for tort claims.26
Federal section 1983 causes of action also may be subject to sovereign immunity
defenses.27 For section 1983 claims brought against states in federal court, the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution may confer an independent,
but analogous, defense.28 The Eleventh Amendment prevents federal court
jurisdiction where "arms of the state" are named as defendants in suits brought
without the consent of the state. 29 Therefore, for many plaintiffs with claims arising
from termination or demotion actions of governmental employers, New Mexico's
statutory written contract exception will provide the broadest waiver of sovereign
immunity.
C.

Scope of the Written ContractException
The New Mexico Supreme Court narrowed the grant of sovereign immunity
conferred by section 37-1-23 in Spray v. City of Albuquerque.30 In Spray, the court
ruled that section 37-1-23 did not apply to cities, towns, or villages.3" The court

23. Id. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1996).
24. See Silva v. Town of Springer, 121 N.M. 428,435,912 P.2d 304, 311 (Ct. App. 1996).
25. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) with N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4 to 41-4-12
(Repl. Pamp. 1996).
26. For the specific categories of tortious governmental activity for which immunity is waived, see New
Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-5 to 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1996). These waivers of immunity
provide for liability arising from operation or maintenance of motor vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft, see id. § 41-4-5;
buildings, public parks, machinery, equipment, and furnishings, see id. § 41-4-6; airports, see id. § 41-4-7; public
utilities, see id. § 41-4-8; medical facilities, see id. § 41-4-9; health care providers, see id. § 41-4-10; highways and
streets, see id. § 41-4-11; and law enforcement, see id. § 41-4-12.
27. See Garcia v. Board of Educ. of Socorro Consol. Sch. Dist. 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985). But see
Daddow v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 120 N.M. 97, 898 P.2d 1235 (1995) (holding that school districts, boards of
education, and their members are not absolutely immune from suits which allege denials of due process
in an employment termination action brought under section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). State sovereign
immunity defenses to section 1983 causes of action brought in state court may also be limited by the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1989).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
29. See Daddow, 120 N.M. at 100-01, 898 P.2d at 1239-40 (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)).
30. 94 N.M. 199,608 P.2d 511 (1980). In Spray, homeowners sued to enjoin the City of Albuquerque from
constructing a fence that violated a contract between the homeowners and the City. See id. at 199, 608 P.2d at 511.
On appeal, the City of Albuquerque raised the defense of sovereign immunity under section 37-1-23 of the New
Mexico Statutes, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). See Spray, 94 N.M. at 201, 608 P.2d at 513.
31. See id.
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reasoned that section 37-1-24,32 (which concerned suits against cities, towns, and
villages or officers thereof), could be reconciled with section 37-1-23 only if section
33
37-1-23 were held to be inapplicable to cities, towns, and villages. After Spray,
34
cities, towns, and villages could be sued on written or unwritten contracts.
In Swinney v. Deming Board of Education, the New Mexico Supreme Court faced
the same question that Garcia was to later pose. 35 A fractured court in Swinney
refused to decide the issue of whether implied contracts incorporating certain written
terms were within the section 37-1-23 exception. 36 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Franchini, did not address the nature of the contract or the application of the
sovereign immunity statute.37 In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Ransom
38
classified Swinney's contract as an express written contract. In his dissent, thenChief Justice Montgomery foreshadowed Garcia when he stated that sovereign
terms. 39
immunity should be waived for implied contracts with operative written
Two years after Swinney, the issue of whether implied contracts are included in
the written contract exception of section 37-1-23 again came before the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Garcia.' This time, the court answered the question that its
Swinney decision sidestepped.
IV. RATIONALE
In Garcia,the New Mexico Supreme Court held that governmental entities were
liable for claims arising from implied employment contracts which contained written
personnel policy statements. 4' By reaching this question, the supreme court implicitly
agreed with the district court that the MRGCD was a "governmental entity" that
would be entitled to sovereign immunity in a proper case.4 2

32. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-24 (Repl. Parnp. 1990).
33. See Spray, 94 N.M. at 202, 608 P.2d at 514.
34. See id.
35. See Swinney v. Board of Educ., 117 N.M. 492, 873 P.2d 238 (1994). In Swinney, the trial court dismissed
a breach of contract claim against the Deming Board of Education on the grounds that an implied contract did not
fall within the written contract exception of section 37-1-23(A) of the New Mexico Statutes, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 371-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). See Swinney, 117 N.M. at 492, 873 P.2d at 238. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed,
albeit with a special concurring opinion by Justice Ransom and a dissenting opinion by then-Chief Justice
Montgomery, but on the grounds that tenure provisions in an employee manual did not apply to school administrators.
See id. at 494, 873 P.2d at 240.
36. See id. at 495, 873 P.2d at 241 (Montgomery, C.J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 493-94, 873 P.2d at 23940.
38. See id. at 494, 873 P.2d at 240 (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
39. See id. at 495, 873 P.2d at 241 (Montgomery, CJ., dissenting).
40. See Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 121 N.M. 728, 918 P.2d 7 (1996).
41. See id. at 734, 918 P.2d at 13.
42. See id. at 730, 918 P.2d at 9. Conservancy districts such as the defendant in Garciaare created pursuant
to New Mexico statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-14-1 (1978). In addition to conservancy districts, a wide variety
of other so-called "quasi-municipal corporations" exist under New Mexico law. These quasi-municipal corporations
include artesian conservancy districts, see id §§ 73-1-1 to 73-1-27 (1978); water users' associations, see id. §§ 73-5-1
to 73-5-9; drainage districts, see id §§ 73-6-1 to 73-6-44; irrigation districts, see id. §§ 73-9-1 to 73-9-62; water and
sanitation districts, see id. §§ 73-21-1 to 73-21-54; and wind erosion districts, see id. §§ 73-22-1 to 73-22-5. The
qualified grant of sovereign immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act has previously been extended to some
quasi-municipal corporations as "political subdivisions" of the state. See Tompkins v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 96
N.M. 368, 630 P.2d 767 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that irrigation districts are political subdivisions of the state and
are entitled to qualified sovereign immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act). The MRGCD and similar
special disticts do not fall under the exception to sovereign immunity in section 37-1-24, (concerning suits against

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The Garciacourt then examined whether an exception to governmental immunity
was available to the plaintiff.43 The court first determined whether a contract existed
between the MRGCD and Garcia. Then the court determined what was the nature of
the contract it found existed between the MRGCD and Garcia, including the
relevance of the MRGCD's written Personnel Policy Statement." The court finally
considered whether the contract found should fall within the "valid written contracts"
exception to sovereign immunity conferred by section 37-1-23. 45
The court found that an implied employment contract existed between Garcia and
the MRGCD based on the conduct of the two parties. 46 The court stated that the
MRGCD made an offer of employment to Garcia in 1975 and that Garcia accepted
the offer when he carried out the specific tasks that the MRGCD required him to
perform.4' There was mutual consideration based on the compensation paid to Garcia
by the MRGCD and the performance of services by Garcia.
According to the court, a second implied contract was formed upon Garcia's
promotion by the MRGCD to the position of Division Manager in 1976.4 This
second implied contract arose when the MRGCD offered the position of Division
Manager to Garcia, Garcia accepted the position, and the two parties provided mutual
consideration.49 The MRGCD terminated this second implied contract by demoting
Garcia in August 1990.'
The court next analyzed whether this second implied contract was terminable at
will.51 The court noted that because of the at will nature of employment in New
Mexico, implied employment contracts are terminable at the will of either party,
absent a contract term stating otherwise.52 Therefore, the court reasoned, Garcia's
second implied contract in which he was promoted to Division Manager could be
terminated by the MRGCD at any time, unless a contract term was implied to restrict
the MRGCD.53

cities, towns, villages, or officers thereof), which is limited to actions against "any city, town, or village in this state."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
43. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10. Contractual exceptions to sovereign immunity are
enumerated in sections 37-1-23 to 37-1-26 of the New Mexico Statutes. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1-23 to 37-1-26
(Repl. Pamp. 1990). For actions sounding in tort, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, id § 41-4-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1996),
provides a general grant of sovereign immunity to governmental entities, subject to waiver of sovereign immunity
in certain instances.
44. See Garcia,121 N.M. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.

50. See id.
51.

See id.

52. See Hanbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 115 N.M. 665,668, 857 P.2d 776, 779 (1993). Wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy constitutes a second exception to the employment at will doctrine. See Garcia, 121 N.M.
at 731, 918 P.2d at 10. The contract term may be implied as well. See Hartbarger,115 N.M. at 669, 857 P.2d at 780
(.'An implied-in-fact contract term ... is one that is inferred from the statements or conduct of the parties."' (quoting
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hsp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (alteration in Hartbarger));
see also RSTAiEmEr (SEcoND) OF CONTRACS § 5 cmt. b (1981) (contract term may be implied as reflecting the
presumed intentions of the parties or based on considerations of public policy).
53. See Garcia,121 N.M. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10.
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The Graciacourt held that the MRGCD' s Personnel Policy Statement was part of
the implied employment contract between the MRGCD and Garcia. 4 The court noted
that employee handbooks, personnel policy guides, and similar documents may
constitute implied employment contracts or implied contract terms.15 However, not
all such documents will constitute implied contracts.56 The test to determine whether
a document rises to the level of an implied contract, according to the court, is the
degree of the employee's reliance and promissory estoppel: when the document
modifies the employment relationship so that an employee could reasonably rely on
an employer conforming to its procedures, the document's terms will be deemed part
of the implied contract." The court applied this test and found that the
comprehensive nature of the MRGCD's Personnel Policy Statement controlled the
MRGCD's employer-employee relationships." The court also found that employee
reliance upon the printed policy statement was reasonable because of the specific
language contained within the policy.59 Therefore, the court concluded that the
MRGCD's Personnel Policy Statement was part of the implied employment contract
between the MRGCD and Garcia.
The court next concluded that the waiver of governmental immunity granted by
section 37-1-23(A) applies to implied contracts with incorporated written terms.'
The court noted two policy reasons for the waiver of sovereign immunity for written
contracts. 6' First, due to the volume of contracts that governmental entities make,
contract terms that are not put in writing are likely to be forgotten.62 Hence, waiver
of sovereign immunity encourages parties that contract with governmental entities to
put the contract in writing.63 Second, written contracts enable courts to determine

54. See id. at 732, 918 P.2d at 11.
55. See id. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10; see also Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980)
(personnel policy guide may constitute an implied contract). The Garcia court did not clearly indicate whether it
treated the MRGCD's Personnel Policy Statement as an implied employment contract or an implied term in the
employment contract. At one point in its opinion, the court "h[el]d that the [MRGCD] Personnel Policy [Statement
was] part of [the] MRGCD's and Garcia's implied employment contract." Garcia, 121 N.M. at 732, 918 P.2d at 11.
In its conclusion, the court restated its holding "that the Personnel Policy [Statement] constitutes an implied
employment contract." Id. at 734, 918 P.2d at 13. The court analyzed offer, acceptance, and consideration for the
implied employment contract as a whole and did not address these elements for the Personnel Policy standing on its
own. See id. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10. Therefore, it is more likely than not that the court considered the MRGCD's
Personnel Policy Statement to be a term in the implied employment contract.
56. Seeid. at732, 918 P.2dat 11.
57. See id.; see also Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1989);
Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Mgmt. Co., 106 N.M. 664, 666-67, 748 P.2d 507, 509-10 (1988); Forrester,93 N.M. at
782, 606 P.2d at 192.
58. See Garcia,121 N.M. at732, 918 P.2dat 11.
59. The court noted the following language in the MRGCD's Personnel Policy Statement:
An employee may be demoted or reclassified to another position and pay for which he is qualified,
or have his pay in the same position reduced (a) when he would otherwise be terminated; or (b)
when he does not possess the necessary qualifications to render satisfactory service in the position
he holds, or is recommended for separation during probation; or (c) when he voluntarily requests
such demotion or reclassification.
Id. (quoting MRGCD Personnel Policy Statement, § 502).
60. See id. at 734, 918 P.2d at 13.
61. See id. at 733, 918 P.2d at 12.
62. See id.; cf Sena Sch. Bus Co. v. Board of Educ. of Santa Fe Public Schs., 101 N.M. 26,29,677 P.2d 639,
642 (Ct. App. 1984).
63. See Garcia,121 N.M. at 732-33, 918 P.2d at 11-12.
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more readily whether a contract involves a proper governmental business function
or an ultra vires action on the part of the entity.'
Having identified the above two policy goals for waiver of sovereign immunity,
the court concluded that the written MRGCD Personnel Policy Statement satisfied
them. The court stated that because the MRGCD's Personnel Policy Statement was
written, its terms were memorialized, thus satisfying both policy goals, as described
above, of a waiver.65
V. ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court's extension of the section 37-1-23(A) waiver of
sovereign immunity to implied contracts with written terms continues a trend of
decisions in New Mexico that limits sovereign immunity. Previously, the court held
that cities, towns, and villages may be sued for unwritten contracts.6 The court also
immunity defenses in tort actions 67 and federal section
recently limited sovereign
68
actions.
1983 civil rights
The court's decision to incorporate the MRGCD's written policy manual into
Garcia's implied employment contract is consistent with a long series of New Mexico
cases over the past two decades.69 In prior breach of implied contract employment
cases, the court recognized the validity of implied contracts and developed a two-part
test to determine if an alleged implied contract existed. Under the test, the existence

64. See id. at 733, 918 P.2d at 12. The court noted that "governmental entities cannot enter contracts that
would either curtail their authority or otherwise fall outside of their designated powers." Id. An example of an
employment contract that was outside the designated power of the officials purporting to authorize it was discussed
in Trujillo v. Gonzales, 106 N.M. 620, 747 P.2d 915 (1947). In Trujillo, two county commissioners agreed to hire
a county road superintendent for a two-year term. See id at 620-21, 747 P.2d at 915-16. The oral agreement to retain
the employee for two years was held to be beyond the power of the commissioners. See id. at 622, 747 P.2d at 917.
65. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 733-34, 918 P.2d at 12-13.
66. See Spray v. City of Albuquerque, 94 N.M. 199, 608 P.2d 511 (1980). In Spray, the court interpreted
conflicting language between section 37-1-23 and section 37-1-24 of the New Mexico Statutes to mean that cities,
towns, and villages do not share the governmental immunity for unwritten contracts under section 37-1-23 of the New
Mexico Statutes that other governmental entities possess. See id. at 202, 608 P.2d at 514. Section 37-1-24 provides
that:
[n]o suit, action or proceeding at law or equity, for the recovery of judgment upon, or the
enforcement or collection of any sum of money claimed due from any city, town or village in this
state, or from any officer as such of any such city, town or village in this state, arising out of or
founded upon any ordinance, trust relation or contract written or unwritten . . . shall be
commenced except within three years next after the date of the act of omission or commission
giving rise to the cause of action.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-24 (1990 Repl. Pamp.). By comparison, section 37-1-23 provides that "[g]ovemmental
entities are granted immunity from actions based on contract, except actions based on a valid written contract." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (1990 Repl. Pamp.).
67. See Weinstein v. City of Santa Fe, 121 N.M. 646, 916 P.2d 1313 (1996). In Weinstein, the court held that
the City of Santa Fe could be held liable under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for the failure of police officers to
forward the necessary paperwork to prosecute a rape suspect. See id. at 649-51,916 P.2d at 1316-318.
68. See Daddow v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 120 N.M. 97, 898 P.2d 1235 (1995). The Daddow court held
that school districts, boards of education, and "[board] members were not absolutely immune from suits [brought
under 42 U.S.C. section] 1983" which alleged denial of due process in an employment termination action. See id. at
99, 898 P.2d at 1237.
69. See, e.g., Swinney v. Deming Bd. of Educ., 117 N.M. 492, 873 P.2d 238 (1994); Newberry v. Allied
Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 773 P.2d 1231 (1989); Vigil v. Arzola, 101 N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); Forrester
v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980).
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of an implied contract is first based on the words and conduct of the parties.7" Then,
a personnel policy guide becomes part of the implied contract if it "control[s] the
employee-employer relationship."'" The test to determine if such a policy guide
consistently controlled the relationship is whether an employee can reasonably expect
an employer to conform to the procedures it outlines.72
The Garcia court, in dicta, reminded employers that employment at will is still the
law in New Mexico.73 However, if a public or private employer chooses to issue a
personnel policy manual upon which its employees could reasonably rely, then that
employer will be held to the terms of its manual under contract law.74 The court
pointed out that employers may freely disclaim the inclusion of the policy statement
in the employment contract with language in the personnel manual. 75 Hence, the
practical effect of Garciaon employment law may be nothing more than encouraging
governmental entities to place disclaimers in their policy manuals.
The Garcia court based its holding on two policy reasons for preferring written
contracts over other types of contracts.76 By choosing to frame the purpose for the
exception to sovereign immunity as a preference for written contracts,77 the court's
holding was assured because the reasons for preferring written contracts over oral or
nonverbal contracts also will apply to written terms that are incorporated in implied
contracts.
The Garcia court could have reached the conclusion that section 37-1-23(A) only
applies to express written contracts had it chosen to analyze the legislative grant of
sovereign immunity as analogous to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The present
version of the written contract exception to sovereign immunity was enacted by the
New Mexico Legislature, as a response to the Hicks v. State decision, 8 in the same
piece of legislation as the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.79 Prior to 1976, the statutory

70. See Forrester,93 N.M. at 782, 606 P.2d at 192.
71. Id.
72. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 732, 918 P.2d at 11; Newberry, 108 N.M. at 427, 773 P.2d at 1234; Forrester,
93 N.M. at 782, 606 P.2d at 192.
73. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 731, 918 P.2d at 10.
74. See id. at 732, 918 P.2d at 11.
75. See id. Holding that employers are obligated under contract law to comply with specific terms in employee
policy manuals that they are not obligated to issue would appear to discourage employers from issuing manuals or
providing specific termination or demotion procedures. Alternatively, employers could seek to avoid contractual
liability by issuing disclaimers that the handbook does not constitute a contract. If the disclaimer made employee
reliance unreasonable, a contract would not be implied from its terms.
76. See id. at 733, 918 P.2d at 12; see also supranotes 61-64 and accompanying text. The two policy reasons
identified by the Garcia court were to encourage parties who contract with the government to memorialize the terms
by putting the contract in writing and to facilitate court determination of whether a governmental entity was acting
ultra vires. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 733, 918 P.2d at 12. After identifying two policy reasons for preferring written
contracts, the court apparently shifted the burden to the defendant, stating that the defendant failed to introduce any
competing policy justifications that would lead to a contrary result. See id. at 733-34, 918 P.2d at 12-13.
77. The court responded to the MRGCD's argument that contracts implied in fact from a personnel policy
manual are not "written" contracts within the meaning of section 37-1-23 of the New Mexico Statutes by observing
that the waiver of sovereign immunity in that section "has the practical effect of encouraging parties who contract with
governmental entities to do so in writing." Id at 732-33, 918 P.2d at 11-12. The court did not discuss the distinctions
between express and implied written contracts, but instead noted that implied written contracts hold the same
advantages over unwritten contracts as express written contracts hold. See id.
78. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
79. See 1976 N.M. Laws ch. 58. For adiscussion of the events that led to enactment of the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act, see supra note 19.
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written contract exception provided that "[a]ctions not otherwise provided by law"
could be brought and "judgment[s] enforced against the state and any of its agencies
when based on a written contract."' The language of the statutory written contract
exception was modified to make the exception consistent with the approach of the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 81 granting "governmental entities" blanket immunity
82
"from actions based on contract, except actions based on a valid written contract."
The language of the modified written contract exception clarifies that sovereign
immunity in contract actions against governmental entities is the rule, absent an
3
exception for "valid written contracts" or other exceptions provided by law.
Viewed in this context, a waiver of immunity for causes of action based on written
contracts is one bom out of necessity. Blanket governmental immunity from contract
liability, without exception, would stifle private parties from dealing with the state
and local government because private parties would be unable to enforce agreements.
The written contract exception to immunity may be viewed as a limited exception,
without which parties would cease to contract with the government, rather than as a
preference for written contracts.
Following this line of analysis, the scope of the written contract exception should
encompass only those contracts that the private party sought to make enforceable
against the government. Parties entering into express written contracts have a greater
expectation of enforceability because the language of the agreement has been
memorialized and the parties have clearly manifested their intent to be bound.
The court's expansion of the written contract exception does not necessarily further
the policy goal of encouraging parties to enter into commercial transactions with
governmental entities. Implied contracts are different in nature from express
contracts. Implied contracts arise from promises inferred from the words or conduct
of the parties in the absence of express bargained-for terms.' A governmental
employer and a prospective employee are free to enter into an express written
employment contract, which would be enforceable under the written contract
exception even before the Garciaexpansion. The additional encouragement that the
Garciadecision provides to parties seeking to transact business with governmental
entities appears to be minimal, in light of the fact that the parties in Garciachose to
forgo the option of an express contract.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The formal holding in Garcia is written narrowly to encompass only implied
employment contracts with written terms embodied in such documents as personnel

80. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23-1 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
81. See id. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996).
82. Id. § 37-1-23 (Repi. Pamp. 1990).
83. See id. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). The Garciacourt did not address the meaning of the word "valid"
in the context of the written contract exception. At first glance, the term might appear redundant because the plaintiff
in a contract action against a governmental entity stil would have to prove validity of the contract after overcoming
the governmental immunity defense. However, the word "valid" would have meaning by precluding actions for
quantum meruit against a governmental entity based on an invalid written contract.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
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policy statements and employee handbooks.85 However, the court's reasoning can
apply to any implied-in-fact contract with written terms.
An employment contract is implied from the words or conduct of the parties that
manifests their mutual assent to the implied terms.86 Implied-in-fact contracts may
arise in other contexts besides employment. For example, implied contracts might be
inferred from the conduct of governmental agencies providing services such as
education, public utilities, irrigation, law enforcement, and public safety.87 Contracts
also may be implied based on the conduct of the parties in commercial transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code.88
Governmental entities such as the MRGCD routinely conduct their operations
under the direction of boards or commissions that issue written policy statements,
resolutions, ordinances, and similar documents. Any of these written documents may
constitute terms to implied contracts to the extent that they control the governmental
entity in its relationship with other parties.
School boards and related governmental entities that are involved in education
may encounter difficulties which result from the court's holding in Garcia.School
handbooks, policy manuals, and similar written documents are similar to employee
handbooks because they are sufficiently detailed to control the relationship between
a school district and a student. The Garciaholding provides no principled distinction
which would permit waiver of sovereign immunity in an employment context while
retaining sovereign immunity in an educational setting. A torrent of litigation against
public school districts based on implied contracts could result if subsequent court
decisions do not clarify or limit the Garciaholding.
As the Garciacourt noted, not all personnel manuals may constitute terms to an
implied contract." The test of whether a policy manual gives rise to implied contract
terms that bind the employer is whether it "controlled the employer-employee
relationship and an employee could reasonably expect his employer to conform to the
procedures it outlines."0 If the holding in Garciais extended outside the context of
employment law, then a similar test ought to be applied to determine whether written
policies should be incorporated into implied contracts. For example, purchasing
policies of a governmental entity might give rise to implied contracts if the vendor
could reasonably expect the governmental entity to conform to those procedures.
Written policies of the governmental entity in performing services might be a source
85. See Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 121 N.M. 728, 734, 918 P.2d 7, 13 (1996).
86. See Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 179, 793 P.2d 855, 861 (1990).
87. For illustration, in an educational setting an implied contract might arise from a written curriculum guide
that provides very specific topics to be covered in a course of study. The attendance of the student, payment of any
fees, and other participation in school activities by the student and family could provide adequate consideration for
the school district's promise to provide education in accordance with the curriculum guide.
88. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1977). The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by New Mexico. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1-101 to 55-12-109 (1993 Repl. Ramp. & 1996 Cum. Supp.); see also id.N.M. STAT. ANN.
ch. 55, art. 1,General Provisions, Compiler's notes. The classic example of an implied contract based on the conduct
of the parties in commercial transactions is the "battle of the forms," where the seller ships goods to the buyer and
the buyer makes payment, despite the fact that the terms contained in the purchase order and the invoice conflict. In
such a case, a contract is implied in fact, with terms incorporated pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1977).
89. See Garcia, 121 N.M. at 732, 918 P.2d at 11.
90. Id.; see Newberry v. Allied Stores, 108 N.M. 427, 773 P.2d 1234 (1989); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Mgmt.
Co., 106 N.M. 664, 667, 748 P.2d 507, 509 (1988).
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of contractual liability (assuming other contractual requirements, such as mutual
consideration, are satisfied) if the recipient of the services held a similar, reasonable
expectation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District decision provides
plaintiffs with a cause of action against governmental entities for breach of implied
contracts. The reasoning in Garcia may apply beyond the employment context,
permitting plaintiffs to cite written language in policy statements, ordinances,
manuals, or similar documents as a basis for a governmental entity's contractual
liability. To be incorporated in the implied contract, a writing must be specific
enough for the plaintiff to expect the governmental entity to conform to it and the
plaintiff must have reasonably relied on the writing. Governmental entities can
disclaim contractual liability by including language in the particular writing that the
writing is not to be the basis of any implied contract. Plaintiffs are likely to attempt
to broaden the Garciaholding beyond the employment context, particularly into the
areas of education and provision of government services. If they are successful, the
New Mexico Supreme Court will need to decide whether it should limit the Garcia
decision so that not every reasonably specific policy or manual that gives rise to
reliance also gives rise to implied contract liability of a governmental entity.
BRIAN K. MATISE

